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Abstract. This article demonstrates that the design and nature of agricultural support
schemes has an influence on farmers’ perception of their level of dependence on agricul-
tural support. While direct aid payments inform farmers about the extent to which they are
subsidised, indirect support mechanisms veil the level of subsidisation, and therefore they
are not fully aware of the extent to which they are supported. To test this hypothesis, we
applied data from a survey of 4,500 farmers in three countries: the United Kingdom,
Germany and Portugal. It is demonstrated that indirect support, such as that provided
through artificially high consumer prices, gives an illusion of free and competitive markets
among farmers. This ‘visibility’ hypothesis is evaluated against an alternative hypothesis that
assumes farmers have complete, or at least a fairly comprehensive level of, information on
agricultural support schemes. Our findings show that this alternative hypothesis can be ruled
out.
Introduction
In a context characterised by great social, political and economic complexity,
people are likely to develop their perceptions on the basis of incomplete infor-
mation. In forming their perceptions of public policies, they tend to rely
strongly on the signals public policies send. Given these limitations on citi-
zens’ ability to understand public policies, the political process of designing
these policies is a strategic act that aims at mobilising some segments of the
public while keeping others passive. The use of specific policy instruments
highlights some effects while blurring others, and this has very important po-
litical consequences even if citizens wrongly perceive policy. As Arnold (1990:
25) points out: ‘Citizens may have imperfect understanding of cause and effect
in the policy world. Nevertheless, their beliefs about cause and effect are
important, for beliefs may affect . . . their preferences about policy issues.’ An
important factor affecting citizens’ perception of public policies is their degree
of visibility. By hiding some effects of policies from the public, policy makers
can, for instance, blur their apparent costs.
In agricultural policy studies, it has been assumed that the degree of vis-
ibility of a support mechanism plays an important role in influencing con-
sumers’ and taxpayers’ attitudes to agricultural support. It is argued that the
use of indirect (or low-visibility) farm support has the effect of politically paci-
fying consumers and taxpayers because they are not aware of the actual cost
of that agricultural support. In the European Union (EU), farm subsidies are
basically provided in two ways: either through direct aid payments to farmers
(e.g., payments per hectare farmed) or through price support (i.e., keeping the
prices received by farmers for their produce above world market prices – e.g.,
the EU price of sugar is three times as high as the world market price). Direct
aid payments are funded from tax revenues, whereas in price support systems,
consumers provide the bulk of the support to the farmer through paying arti-
ficially high food prices.
Direct support is much more visible to taxpayers than price support
because the costs are clearly stated in public budgets. This makes it an easy
target for those who oppose subsidising agriculture and farmers. Thus, it is
often claimed that the farming lobby has a strong interest in designing agri-
cultural support schemes in a way that hides the costs to consumers and 
taxpayers because it prevents them from questioning agricultural policy (see
Roberts et al. 1999: 80; Kjeldahl 1994: 7; Rieger 2000: 198). There is some evi-
dence that this reasoning can indeed be found among farm unions. The Euro-
pean association of farm unions, COPA, has expressed fears that farm interests
would be vulnerable to a switch from price support to direct payments, arguing
that: ‘[I]t is not certain that Community taxpayers will agree to shoulder the
financial burden on a permanent and continuous basis’ (COPA 1991: 3).
However, the assumption that agricultural support provided through public
budgets is more vulnerable to political opposition is questioned by Coleman
et al. (1997: 472) on the basis of experiences in the United States. Their scep-
ticism stems from the fact that direct income support to American farmers was
introduced in 1985, but it was not until 1996 that it became subject to politi-
cal attack. However, comparative studies on the consequences of applying
direct support payments to farmers are needed before any firm conclusions
on the question can be drawn. Although policy feedback processes seem to
gather increasing interest in explaining policy development over time (e.g.,
Thelen 1999; Pierson 2000), the phenomenon has rarely been studied in agri-
culture (for a rare and excellent study on policy feedback in agriculture, see
Coleman & Grant (1998), who analyse the feedback effect of agricultural
finance policies on the liberalisation of agricultural credit systems in five 
countries).
The assumed relationship between visibility of public policies and citizens’
perception has been more systematically investigated in the area of taxation
policy. For instance, Wilensky (1976) argued that the visibility of taxes is an
important factor helping to explain tax backlashes, and Hansen (1983) main-
tained that politicians deliberately disguise taxes to reduce the risk of politi-
cal opposition to taxation. An important research agenda in the study of
taxation policy has been to establish whether tax systems characterised by a
low degree of tax visibility provides fiscal illusions to a higher extent than
those characterised by visible taxation. Fiscal illusion refers to ‘a systematic
misperception of fiscal parameters’ (Oates 1991: 433; emphasis added).
However, Oates’ review shows that the research findings on the issue are
inconclusive in part because studies of fiscal illusion use indirect measures to
reveal the phenomenon. As Oates (1991: 433) says:
[T]he recent empirical literature on fiscal illusion has focused exclusively
on the revenue side of the [public] budget; it consists of studies of tax
and debt illusion. These studies search for evidence linking relatively
hidden elements in the revenue structure to higher levels of taxes or
spending. (see also Winter & Mouritzen 2001: 111)
A much more reliable way to ‘measure’ fiscal illusion would be to under-
take a survey among taxpayers to reveal their perception of taxation levels.
While such studies of various types of fiscal illusions have been undertaken
(e.g., Winter & Mouritzen 2001; Sørensen 1992), the assumption of a relation-
ship between visibility of taxes and citizens’ perceptions of the taxes is weakly
underpinned empirically. However, Blom-Hansen (2005) tests this assump-
tion. He examined whether Danish renters suffer from fiscal illusion in rela-
tion to property taxation (renter illusion). To renters, property taxes are not
visible because they are levied on the owner of the property, who passes them
on to renters by including them in the rent. Blom-Hansen’s survey shows 
that renters estimate the property tax rate less correctly than do property
owners, but their estimations are not systematically biased, which is the defin-
ing criterion of the fiscal illusion hypothesis (see above). According to the
renter illusion hypothesis, one would expect renters systematically to under-
estimate the tax rate, but they do not. Thus, the hypothesis is not supported
by the findings.
Returning to the issue of the agricultural policy design’s consequences for
citizens’ perceptions, we focus on the extent to which the policy design creates
illusions among farmers. Agricultural policies providing support to farmers
through artificially high consumer prices can be claimed to create a market
illusion. Price support uses market mechanisms to allocate revenue, and this
veils to many farmers the fact that they are subject to major income transfers
from the rest of the society. Indeed, indirect support may very well give
farmers the illusion that they operate in a free and competitive market 
(Daugbjerg 2003: 429). We adopt Blom-Hansen’s (2005) research approach.
We apply results from a survey to reveal the extent to which farmers suffer
from market illusions. In the next section, we develop the hypotheses to be
tested. Following this, the methodology employed to test the hypotheses is
detailed. We go on to present the findings and, finally, draw conclusions.
Hypotheses
Even with the best of intentions, it may not be possible to take rational deci-
sions because of a lack of complete information or because obtaining com-
plete information may be a time-consuming task and require special skills.
Moreover, in contrast to the market, where prices provide good guidelines to
economic actors, politics ‘lacks anything like the measuring rod of price’
(Pierson 2000: 260); therefore, citizens use other sources of information when
they acquire knowledge about public policies that affect them. In this process,
the specific design of public policies becomes an important source of infor-
mation influencing their perception of policy:
The specific design of programs may heighten the visibility of some social
and political connections while obscuring others. In a context of great
social complexity, policies may generate ‘focusing events’ or cues that
help social actors to interpret the world around them. Policy induced cues
may influence an individual’s awareness of activity. (Pierson 1993: 619)
Citizens’ awareness of policy effects may be based on an imperfect under-
standing of the way in which the policy produces its effects. For example,
Arnold (1990: 21) argues that people are more likely to understand the causal
chain of single-stage policy instruments with immediate effects than that of
multi-stage instruments with mediated effects because the policy mechanisms
of the former tend to be more visible to them than those of the latter. In agri-
cultural policy, it is much easier for farmers (and taxpayers as well) to detect
the transfer effects of direct agricultural subsidies such as annual area pay-
ments than it is to discern the transfer effects of multi-stage policy instruments
(e.g., indirect price support working through market management) even
though the two support types have similar income effects. In the latter case,
farmers may not realise the magnitude of agricultural support and its eco-
nomic importance for them. Thus, ‘visibility . . . can vary independently of a
policy’s actual impact and . . . this variation may be a product of policy design’
(Pierson 1993: 622).
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has used two different
approaches to boost farm incomes. Before the MacSharry reform of May 1992,
most of the market regimes applied a high price model. These high prices were
maintained by managing markets using import taxes, intervention purchases
and export subsidies (with production often constrained by measures to
control supply such as quotas). Through the increased prices they pay, con-
sumers bear a major part of the cost of supporting farmers. This is true of the
milk regime. The MacSharry reforms reduced intervention prices substantially
in some sectors, and introduced direct payments to compensate farmers for
the revenue loss. Thus cereal producers receive an area payment for the crops
they grow; and beef producers receive a headage payment for the animals they
keep. The so-called ‘Agenda 2000’ reform of March 1999 continued along this
path by further reducing guaranteed prices and increasing direct payments. In
practice, the two approaches are sometimes used at the same time within the
same commodity regime (Swinbank 2002). The Fischler reforms, proposed ini-
tially in July 2002 and enacted in June 2003, have continued the reform process,
but they came after the survey of farmers reported in this article.
The level of visibility of agricultural support in the two approaches out-
lined above is very different. Agricultural policies applying direct subsidy
schemes clearly inform farmers (and the public) that they are the recipients
of an income transfer from society. The magnitude of the individual payments
is clearly seen by farmers when they receive the transfer (Kjeldahl 1994: 7),
and they can easily calculate how dependent their income is upon agricultural
subsidies; thus, direct payments can be said to have a high degree of 
visibility. As a result of being informed about the magnitude of support,
farmers realise how dependent agriculture is on support.
Agricultural policies applying the high price model produce a market illu-
sion among farmers, veiling the fact that they are, in fact, subject to major
income transfers from the rest of society. Nevertheless, farmers may be aware
of the actual benefits they receive from indirect and less visible payments. Fol-
lowing Arnold (1990: 29–30), who argues that information on the costs and
benefits of policy is easily disseminated within national communities of 
citizens who have specialised communication networks maintained by inter-
est associations, one could argue that information on support levels may be
widely known among farmers. However, there are some facts that people do
not want to know, especially if they contradict their core values (Pierson 2000:
260). Farmers may be uncomfortable with the fact that they are major recipi-
ents of public support, making them look like social security clients, and thus
they may make no efforts to search for such information, nor may it be 
disseminated to them by their unions. Under such circumstances, the major-
ity of farmers would have limited knowledge of their dependence on agricul-
tural subsidies since the support model does not enable them to calculate the
share of their gross receipts that can be put down to agricultural support. The
market illusion created by price support may lead farmers to believe that agri-
culture is less dependent on agricultural support than it actually is.
The fact that the CAP market regimes vary in the way in which they sub-
sidise farmers enables us to explore whether the degree of visibility of 
the support mechanisms affects farmers’ perceptions of agriculture’s depend-
ence on farm subsidies. As a means of examining this issue, we present two
hypotheses:
H1: Farmers receiving direct (i.e., visible) payments perceive dependence
on agricultural support to be higher than those who farm under market
regimes using indirect support measures, irrespective of the actual level
of support.
H0: Perceived dependence on agricultural support is determined pri-
marily by actual level of support.
The counter hypothesis (H0) is based on a rational actor perspective in which
farmers are assumed to possess complete, or at least fairly comprehensive,
information on the regulatory environment within which they conduct their
enterprise and thus understand the true nature of their support. Consequently,
we would expect those farmers who are the most dependent on agricultural
subsidies to be those who are most supportive of the CAP. Farmers’ actual
dependence on subsidies is assumed to equate to the level of support received
by farmers within each of the market regimes. The actual level of support is
measured by the Producer Support Estimate (PSE), which expresses the share
of farmers’ gross farm receipts that can be attributed to direct or indirect
support (OECD 2002: 236; Legg 2003). This level varies significantly across
market regimes.
Methodology
Evidence to test the two propositions or hypotheses was derived from a three-
country (Germany, Portugal and the United Kingdom) postal survey of
farmers carried out during the autumn and winter of 2001–2002, as part of a
research project looking at the acceptability of the introduction of a Bond
Scheme as part of CAP reform (Swinbank & Tranter 2004). The survey used
an identical four-page questionnaire sent to 4,500 farmers in each of three
countries. The sample was drawn from the Yellow Pages telephone book for
the United Kingdom, pension records for Germany and the list of farmers
from the Office of National Statistics for Portugal. When tested for represen-
tativeness, it was discovered that those with larger farm businesses were some-
what over-represented in each of the three countries. The response rate
following two reminders was 40.2 per cent for the United Kingdom, 36.8 per
cent for Germany and 33.4 per cent for Portugal. Tests for non-response bias
were carried out in each country. Only two significant differences were found:
the responses were biased towards older farmers in Portugal, and towards
better-educated farmers in the United Kingdom.
On the survey questionnaire, farmers were asked to indicate their main
type of farming activity by choosing from one of nine fixed categories. They
were also asked to give their cropping and grass areas and livestock numbers.
From this information, it was possible to assign farmers to the CAP commodity
market regime in which they were predominately operating. However, this 
categorisation was not perfectly defined as many farmers operate under more
than one market regime and thus may receive both direct and indirect support
from the EU. For example, a farm that is predominately dairy may also grow
cereals or maize for cattle feed and have a number of sheep and/or beef 
cattle. Thus, the farm business operates under three CAP commodity market
regimes.
While a considerable number of arable farmers in the survey sample do
not keep livestock and therefore only operate under the arable market
regimes (all of which use direct payments), there are very few dairy farmers
who only have one farming activity and thus operate under only one com-
modity market regime. Thus, say, dairy farmers’ perceived dependence on agri-
cultural support which, on the basis of the limited visibility of that support,
one would expect to be lower than that of arable farmers, may be distorted by
the fact that they also receive direct payments under other market regimes to
which they are eligible. Despite this acknowledged overlapping of farms across
multiple commodity regimes, it is hoped that any disturbance is minimised by
the fact that the farmers were asked to categorise themselves on the survey
questionnaire based on their own perceptions of farm type. Further clarity in
the distinction between farm type categories was obtained by excluding from
the analysis all farmers who described their enterprises as being ‘mixed live-
stock and arable’. However, in interpreting the findings, we must still be aware
that the ‘noise’ introduced by these overlaps might be expected to reduce the
significance of group differences.
For the purpose of this analysis, four farm types were selected (see Table
1): dairy, cereals, pig and beef/sheep farms. Beef and sheep farming was listed
as one category on the questionnaire because many farmers have both sheep
and beef cattle enterprises and these operate under very similar policy
regimes; they both apply direct payments in the form of payment per head of
animal (often known as ‘headage payment’), and the level of subsidy is high.
Therefore, it did not make sense to treat these enterprises separately. Table 1
shows that this sub-sample consisted of a little under 2,000 farmers over the
three countries. Of the total number of farms, 25 per cent were predominantly
dairy, 33 per cent cereals, and nearly 40 per cent veal/beef and lamb/mutton.
A little more than 4 per cent were pig producers. These four broad farm types
were selected for analysis because they operate under four different com-
modity regimes that vary in terms of their degree of visibility and support level
(as measured by the OECD’s PSE). (Table 3 below shows how these four main
commodity regimes differ on the two main dimensions of level of support and
its visibility.)
Farmers in the sample were presented with three statements they were
asked to rank according to the extent to which they were in agreement: ‘The
future of farming is dependent on continued support’ (S1); ‘If current support
is withdrawn, many farms would become unprofitable’ (S2); and ‘Support 
for agricultural production should be phased out gradually’ (S3). The three
responses to these statements were used as indicators of the degree to which
farmers believed agriculture is dependent on support. A five-point Likert scale
was used in each case, with scores ranging from 5 (‘Strongly agree’) to 1
(‘Strongly disagree’). For the purpose of this analysis, responses to these three
statements were averaged to yield a single overall measure (or score) for each
farmer showing the extent to which they believe that agriculture is dependent
on support. Agreement with S1 and S2 is taken to reflect affirmation of a
dependence on support. Agreement with S3 is taken to reflect denial of a
dependence on support. In constructing the composite variable, therefore, the
five-point scale for S3 was inverted before combining with S1 and S2.
Table 1. Number of sample farms in each of the key farm types in each country
Combined 
United countries Percentage
Type of farming Kingdom Germany Portugal dataset of total
Milk 330 83 77 490 24.7
Cereals 140 286 231 657 33.1
Beef, veal and 509 95 150 754 38.0
sheep meat
Pigs 13 48 22 83 4.2
Total 992 512 480 1,984 100.0
The results (presented in Table 2) show a strong positive correlation
between S1 and S2 with a coefficient of 0.44 using a Spearman’s correlation
test. A priori, it would be expected that S3 would correlate negatively with S1
and S2, and this is what is actually found: S3 correlates with S1 at -0.45 and
with S2 at -0.25. All these correlations are statistically significant at the 0.1
per cent level. These correlation coefficients were also consistently replicated
in the data for the individual study countries. From this it can be assumed that
the three variables/statements do combine to form a meaningful and coher-
ent construct reflecting perceived dependence of agriculture in general on
support.
It is assumed that farmers’ personal experiences with the support schemes
of the CAP to a considerable extent form their degree of agreement on the
general statements on the dependence on agricultural support. Of course,
this assumption can be questioned, but more specific statements relating to
farmers’ own situations may cause other types of problems because they might
actually measure the influence of other factors, such as farm management skills
and levels of farm debt, on the perception of farmers. Whether or not our
assumption is realistic will in fact be shown in the test of the visibility hypoth-
esis. If the hypothesis is supported by the data, it can be concluded that the
assumption upon which the hypothesis rests is valid.
The findings
The scores in the right-hand columns of Table 3 show the extent to which
respondents agreed with statements relating to the dependence of farming on
support. The findings presented in Table 3 show that the sample farmers, as a
Table 2. An analysis of the level of correlation between the respondents’ levels of agree-
ment on statements related to support for farming
(S1) (S2) (S3)
(S1) ‘The future of farming is 0.43985 -0.45483
dependent on continued (P < 0.0001) (P < 0.0001)
support.’
(S2) ‘If current support is 0.43985 -0.24642
withdrawn, many farms (P < 0.0001) (P < 0.0001)
would become unprofitable.’
(S3) ‘Support for agricultural -0.45483 -0.24642
production should be (P < 0.0001) (P < 0.0001)
phased out gradually.’
Table 3. Farmers’ perceived dependence on support compared with the level and visibility of support
Classification of Measure of the degree Standard deviation of
PSE (%) for EU level of support Visibility of of perceived perceived dependence
Type of farming (1999–2001) based on PSE1 support dependence on support2 scores
Milk 45 Medium Low 3.67 0.83
Cereals 48 Medium High 4.07 0.84
Beef, veal and Beef: 84/Sheep High High 4.09 0.80
sheep meat meat: 61
Pigs 25 Low Low 3.77 0.96
All commodities 36 – – 3.96 0.85
Notes: 1 PSE £ 25 = low, 25 < PSE £ 50 = medium, PSE > 50 = high. 2 Maximum score was 5.
Source for PSE estimates: OECD (2002, 2003).
group, are in strong agreement that farming is dependent on support, although
there is some measure of variation between farm types; the lowest average
score (Milk) is 3.67 out of a possible maximum of 5.
A statistical test was carried out in the form of a general linear model
(GLM) to identify those variables with significant influence on perceived
dependence on support (the dependent variable, DV). A GLM was chosen to
permit categorical independent variables (IV) to be fitted by the use of dummy
variables. These categorical variables were: the case study country, full-
time/part-time farming, level of education, and the farm’s current business
position. Under ideal circumstances, all of these variables would have been
included in a single GLM, together with the key variables associated with the
two hypotheses (H0: support level and H1: visibility), so that the relative
importance of each in influencing perceived level of dependence could be
determined. However, for statistical reasons, this could not be done. As both
level of support and visibility are determined by product regime (represented
in this case by the variable farm type), they have a common source of vari-
ance, and thus the two variables are statistically correlated. In order to avoid
this multi-collinearity problem, it was necessary to gauge the explanatory
power of the two variables in a less direct manner.
Three separate GLM models were run sharing a common dependent vari-
able (perceived dependence on support – details available from the authors
on request). To equation H0 was added the IV, support level; to equation H1
was added visibility; and to equation HC was added the variable farm type –
all other IVs were shared in common (equation HC in this case acted as a
control). Because both support level and visibility are products of farm type,
it is considered to be the best explanatory variable in respect of perceived
dependence. Because all other explanatory factors are controlled, the statisti-
cal model (H0 or H1) that comes closest to matching the model R2 of HC can
be assumed to contain the better determinant of perceived dependence on
support.
Study of the residual errors of the three equations revealed rather skewed
underlying distributions. This in part explains the rather low model R2 values






that were derived. The application of power terms to the dependent variable
was tested, but found not to improve model R2 values significantly (R2 values
for the three models are shown in Table 4).
The R2 value for model H1 is much closer to the control than H0, sug-
gesting that visibility is a better determinant of perceived dependence on
support than actual support level. The statistical significance of these 
differences is confirmed by an F-test comparing the model sum of squares of
H0 and H1 against HC in turn (see Table 5; details of the full models involved
in each case and the resulting coefficients are available from the authors on
request). No significant difference is found between the model sum of squares
(SS) of HC and H1 (p > 0.05), while a very significant difference is found
between the SS of HC and H0.
The correspondence between the sum of squares for model H1 (contain-
ing the visibility variable) and model HC (containing farm type) is key to the
resolution of the hypotheses. This result leads to the conclusion that visibility
of support is a better determinant of perception of dependency on support
than level of support. Having determined the importance of these two sources
of variation relative to each other, the next question is: How important is vis-
ibility in absolute terms? The parameter estimates of the H1 model show that
the move from a low-visibility commodity support regime to a high-visibility
one results in a 0.349 increase in perceived dependency on support, with a con-
fidence interval of 0.265 to 0.433. The H1 model R2 value also provides some
guide, as it tells us that all of the IVs in the model, taken together, account for
just 10 per cent of the variation in the DV. Assuming that all confounding
factors have been eliminated (more discussion of this below) and that this is
an accurate reflection of the impact of these variables, this suggests that 
Table 5. F-tests of the significance of differences in pairs of sum of squares (SS) values (i.e.,
H0 with HC; H1 with HC)
df SS
H1 (visibility) 1782 1137.935
HC 1780 1136.371
F = 1.2257; p = 0.2938.
df SS
H0 (support level) 1781 1156.654
HC 1780 1136.371
F = 31.7915; p = 0.0000.
visibility is, in global terms, playing only a minor role in determining farmers’
perception of the level of dependence on support in agriculture.
The relatively low model R2 values obtained in this analysis merit some
discussion and explanation. Model H1 accounts for just 10 per cent of the vari-
ance of the dependent variable. Power term transformation of the dependent
variable yields little improvement. It is difficult to conceive of explanatory
variables omitted from the analysis that might account for the remaining 90
per cent of variance as a large number of classificatory variables were tested
before arriving at the subset used in the models reported here. Under these
circumstances, the only reasonable course is to assume that the observed low
R2 values (something that is not uncommon when using survey data of this
kind) are due to low variation between groups, at least in terms of the DV.
It is certainly the case that standard deviation scores are both low for all
farm types (with a whole sample average variance of just 25 per cent) and
highly consistent between farm types (see Table 3). This might have a number
of causes. For example, a collective dependency perception may have devel-
oped across all of EU agriculture, resulting perhaps from the high degree of
regulation experienced by EU farmers and the very visible nature of the
debate about the CAP. It is also probable that variation between commodity
regimes is being eroded by the fact that farmers (in particular, those having
livestock) operate under more than one CAP market regime. This is particu-
larly problematic when analysing dairy farmers’ perceptions because many of
them also receive direct crop and/or beef payments and thus receive part of
their support in a highly visible manner.
An additional cause of low R2 scores relates to a degree of collinearity
between the two key explanatory variables (i.e., support level and visibility).
It is apparent looking at Table 3 that in the cases of two of the four commodity
regimes (i.e., pigs and beef/sheep/veal), these two variables co-vary (i.e., where
one is ‘high’ the other is also ‘high’). For data observations in these two com-
modity classes, there is no statistical basis to judge between the two variables.
Removing data for these two commodity regimes increases the H1 model R2
to 11.3 per cent.
The conclusion reached above arising out of the GLM analysis – that vis-
ibility is a better determinant of perceived dependence on support than actual
support level – is further confirmed and developed by paired comparisons of
the dependence scores obtained for each commodity regime (i.e., farm type).
With each of these comparisons, the null hypothesis is the expected outcome
based on support level. For example, in comparing milk with cereals, as the
level of support in each case is classified as ‘Medium’, the null hypothesis 
is that there is no significant difference between the perceived dependence 
on support between the two groups. The information contained in the 
support-level variable therefore provides for a series of one-tailed null
hypotheses, which, as the data are present at the ordinal level of measurement,
are most appropriately analysed by the powerful non-parametric Mann
Whitney U test. The results of these comparisons are shown in Table 6.
These tests again support the hypothesis on the primacy of visibility over
support level. This is particularly evident looking at the comparison of milk
with cereals. Both regimes are supported at roughly the same level (PSE 
percentage of 45 and 48, respectively). Dairy farmers are the group who felt
least dependent on support (a mean score of 3.67), while cereal farmers felt
more dependent on subsidies (a mean score of 4.07). As can be seen in Table
6, the difference between these scores is statistically significant, indicating that
the low visibility of this support has influenced dairy farmers’ perception on
the extent to which agriculture is dependent upon it.
Comparing the perceptions of pig and dairy farmers also supports the vis-
ibility hypothesis as the difference in perceptions is not statistically significant
despite the fact the support levels are very different. As Table 3 shows, the
PSE for pigs is 25 per cent, while it is 45 per cent for milk. Had differences in
support level had explanatory value as H0 suggests, then the difference in per-
ception should have been statistically significant, which it is not. Indeed, the
Table 6. Comparison of dependence scores between commodity regimes, together with pre-
dicted outcomes based on H0 and H1
Predicted outcome
Farm type Mean Visibility Support level
comparison difference hypothesis (H1) hypothesis (H0) Actual result
Milk – Cereals -0.39 S NS S
(p = 0.000)
Milk – Pigmeat -0.09 NS S NS
(p = 0.775)
(B, V, S) – Pigmeat 0.32 S S S
(p = 0.006)
Cereals – Pigmeat 0.30 S S S
(p = 0.012)
Milk – (B, V, S) -0.41 S S S
(p = 0.000)
(B, V, S) – Cereals 0.02 NS S NS
(p = 0.972)
Notes: (B, V, S) is a combined category for beef, veal and sheep meat; NS = not significant;
S = significant.
difference in perception should have been rather large. Comparing the per-
ceptions of pig producers with those of beef/sheep farmers further weakens
H0. Although these two groups of farmers are at the opposite ends of the
support scale (PSE percentage for pigs is 25 and 84/61 for beef/sheep), the dif-
ference in perceptions is not as large as H0 suggests it should be. The com-
parison between cereals and pig farmers does not enable us to establish which
hypothesis is supported by the data in this particular comparison since both
predict a statistically significant difference in perceptions, which is the actual
result.
There is also a statistically significant difference between dairy farmers’ and
beef/sheep farmers’ perceptions. However, it is not possible to tell whether
this is due to differences in visibility or support level. As Table 3 shows, support
to dairy farmers is at a medium level (PSE = 45 per cent), while the level of
support to beef/sheep farmers is high (PSE = 84/61 per cent). This means that
the difference in support level might explain the difference in perception.
However, when we compare the perceptions of the highly supported
beef/sheep farmers with that of the medium supported cereal farmers, we find
no statistically significant difference. Since the market regimes these two
groups of farmers operate under have highly visible support measures, we
must conclude that it is the similar degree of visibility that explains the 
similarity in perceptions on support dependence.
Concluding comments
Our analysis shows that there is clear evidence that the visibility of agricul-
tural subsidies affects how farmers perceive agriculture’s dependence on
support, albeit at a modest level. Farmers receiving direct aid payments, which
are a highly visible means of agricultural support, were more likely to state
that agriculture was dependent on support than were farmers receiving price
support, which is indirect and thus a less visible support measure. The results
of our analysis provide no support for the notion that actual support levels
influence farmers’ perception of dependence on agricultural support (i.e.,
variation in the support level across agricultural commodity groups cannot
explain variation in perceptions). For this reason, farmers cannot be said to
be rational actors, possessing full information on the regulatory context in
which they conduct their farming activity. Instead, their perceptions are influ-
enced by the signals sent through policy design. Since farmers operating pre-
dominately under commodity market regimes applying indirect support tend
to believe that they are less dependent on agricultural support than those
receiving direct support, the CAP does indeed generate market illusions
among some farmers. Thus, farmers’ perceptions are influenced by the signals
that the design of agricultural policy measures brings about. Since we found
that farmers being supported in less visible ways were more likely to state that
they were less dependent on agricultural support than those receiving support
by highly visible means, we have a strong case for arguing that illusions 
may be present in many other types of public policies using less visible policy
instruments.
The MacSharry reforms of the CAP in 1992 cut support prices and intro-
duced direct payments for each hectare of eligible crops sown and each eli-
gible livestock unit kept to compensate farmers for the price reductions. This
resulted in a significant increase in the visibility of agricultural support, and
may have had implications for subsequent agricultural policy reform in the
EU. The Fischler reforms adopted in June 2003 decoupled direct aid payments
from any production requirement with the introduction of the Single Payment
Scheme, established on the basis of a farmer’s prior claims for area and
headage payments. The resistance to the Fischler reforms was significantly
lower within the farming community and among farm ministers than was the
resistance to the transformation from price support into direct support in the
MacSharry reforms of 1992.
Elaborating on our findings, we suggest that an important, but not sole,
reason why European farmers were less opposed to the Fischler reforms of
2003 than they were to the MacSharry reforms of 1992 was the fact that the
introduction of direct payments in 1992 made many farmers aware that they
were subject to major income transfers from the rest of the society – a situa-
tion many of them felt was at odds with their perception of themselves as 
self-employed people. The Fischler reforms decoupled direct payments from
production inputs, but made them conditional on compliance with environ-
mental, animal health and welfare, and food safety regulations and standards
(cross-compliance). This redefinition of direct support from being a compen-
sation payment for price cuts into a payment for non-marketable goods and
services provided to society by farmers may be more attractive than receiving
the direct aid payments introduced in the MacSharry reforms.
In 1992, farm leaders said that the switch from price support to direct
support made the CAP look like a social policy (Daugbjerg 2003: 429), which
was regarded as highly undesirable within the farming community and caused
strong opposition to the 1992 reforms. The redefinition of direct support as a
payment for services to society may make future efforts to reduce or dismantle
direct payments more difficult. Farmers would then feel that they would be
losing payment for their ‘produce’. This might mobilise significant resistance
within the farming community, perhaps precluding support reductions.
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